Withdrawal of resignation before acceptance was central to the Orissa High Court’s decision to restore a judicial officer to service. In Ipsita Mohanty v. State of Orissa and another, decided on 10 September 2026, the court held that the officer’s resignation was not voluntary in the circumstances and that her timely withdrawal could not be defeated by failures in processing it.
The decision matters because it separates three events that are easily confused: submitting a resignation, recommending its acceptance, and acceptance by the authority legally empowered to end the employment. It also distinguishes reinstatement from an award of back wages.
Justices Manash Ranjan Pathak and Sibo Sankar Mishra allowed W.P.(C) No. 15819 of 2023. Their 47-page judgment orders immediate reinstatement, continuity of service and other consequential service benefits, while expressly excluding back wages.
Key takeaways
- The High Court’s administrative recommendation did not itself amount to acceptance by the competent appointing authority.
- The officer’s withdrawal reached the High Court before the Governor approved the resignation.
- The unresolved request for a posting that would allow access to her child’s necessary care was material to the finding that the resignation was involuntary.
- The court applied the relevant earlier service-rule provision, expressly declining to apply a prospective 2025 amendment to the events in question.
- Reinstatement and service continuity were granted, but salary for the period out of service was not.
The sequence that decided the dispute
Mohanty joined the Odisha Judicial Service in 2015. After serving at several stations, she was posted at Bhubaneswar, where she could arrange treatment and therapy for her autistic son. She was transferred to Hindol in July 2022 and joined there as Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate.
The judgment records that the necessary facilities and trained therapists were unavailable at Hindol, Dhenkanal and nearby areas. On 5 September 2022, she submitted a representation seeking a posting at Bhubaneswar for two and a half years. The relevant committee deferred the request, and it was not brought back for a final decision. These findings are explained in paragraphs 14–18 and 71 of the judgment.
The decisive subsequent dates were:
- 29 November 2022: she submitted her resignation in the circumstances described in her representations.
- 20 December 2022: the Full Court resolved to recommend acceptance and to move the State Government for the Governor’s approval.
- 21 December 2022: she submitted a withdrawal, which the High Court’s office received that day.
- 22 December 2022: the then Chief Justice directed that the withdrawal be placed before the Full Court.
- 31 December 2022: the Governor approved the resignation without being informed of the intervening withdrawal.
- 2 January 2023: the State issued the notification that led to her being relieved from service with effect from 3 January.
The court’s account of the State’s affidavit fixes the Governor’s approval on 31 December; the formal notification followed on 2 January. Keeping these steps separate is important when assessing whether the withdrawal came in time. See paragraphs 33–41 and 72–73 of the judgment.
Who could accept the resignation?
The Registrar General’s defence treated the Full Court’s resolution of 20 December as the relevant acceptance. On that view, the withdrawal arrived too late and the later government order merely completed the formal process.
The bench rejected that approach. Reading the judicial-service rules with the constitutional framework, it identified the Governor as the appointing and accepting authority for the relevant cadre. The High Court’s control over the subordinate judiciary did not make its recommendation identical to the formal act of acceptance required in this case.
Article 234 concerns appointments to the judicial service other than district judges. Article 235 vests control over district and subordinate courts in the High Court, subject to the applicable service conditions. The court examined these provisions alongside the recruitment and appointment rules, particularly in paragraphs 53–68. Its conclusion on the competent authority appears in paragraph 62.
This distinction does not diminish the High Court’s constitutional control over judicial officers. It identifies which legal act actually mattered for the resignation. A recommendation moving through the administrative system could not be treated as having already terminated service when the required acceptance had not occurred.
Two complementary reasons for granting relief
The withdrawal preceded effective acceptance
Justice Mishra’s additional concurring reasons focus on the principle in Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301. Subject to any contrary constitutional, legal or contractual provision, a prospective resignation can be withdrawn before it becomes effective. Where the governing conditions require acceptance by a competent authority, merely tendering the resignation ordinarily does not end the employment.
Applying that principle, the concurrence concluded that there was no valid resignation left to accept after Mohanty’s timely withdrawal. It also emphasised that the delay in processing her withdrawal was not her fault. The High Court’s recommendation could not substitute for acceptance by the appointing authority. These reasons appear in paragraphs 5–7 of the concurrence, at pages 44–46.
The main opinion separately scrutinised the communication failure. The State Government and Governor had not been informed of the withdrawal or the direction to place it before the Full Court. Their subsequent action therefore proceeded without material information already available within the High Court’s administrative process.
The resignation was submitted under compelling circumstances
The court did not assess voluntariness merely by asking whether the officer had signed a letter. It examined the unresolved posting representation, the care needs recorded in the case, and the absence of suitable facilities at the place of posting.
It also noted that the record disclosed no pending or contemplated departmental or vigilance case against her and no adverse issue concerning her integrity or efficiency. She had continued working after submitting the resignation. On the facts before it, the court held that the resignation resulted from compelling circumstances and duress. Paragraphs 45, 50–52, 77 and 80 contain this reasoning.
The finding is specific to that record. It does not mean that every difficult personal situation automatically invalidates a resignation.
Why the 2025 amendment did not govern this case
A particularly useful part of the decision concerns the version of the rules that applied. The court considered Rule 34(4) of the Odisha Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1992, dealing with permission to withdraw a resignation in the public interest where compelling reasons and a material change in circumstances are established.
The judgment also reproduces the amended provision notified on 19 May 2025. That version includes additional conditions concerning conduct during the intervening period, absence from duty and availability of the post or a comparable post.
However, paragraph 48 expressly states that the 2025 amendment was prospective and did not apply to this case. The court therefore considered the earlier provision. Readers should not convert the amendment’s 90-day condition into a general explanation of why this officer succeeded: her withdrawal had already been submitted before the relevant acceptance. The temporal distinction is set out at pages 24–27.
What the court ordered—and the limits of the ruling
The bench quashed the 2 January 2023 notification and directed reinstatement forthwith as Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-S.D.J.M. It granted continuity of service and other consequential service benefits from 3 January 2023, but denied back wages. The judgment records that the officer had filed an affidavit foregoing financial benefits for the period during which she did not render service. The writ petition was allowed without an order as to costs: paragraphs 80–83.
The decision does not establish an unrestricted entitlement to a preferred posting. Indeed, paragraph 16 discusses the principle that personal hardship alone does not ordinarily invalidate a transfer, although a representation should receive appropriate consideration. Nor does this judgment make every resignation reversible after acceptance; the governing rules and the dates remain essential.
For practitioners, the practical lesson is to assemble the resignation, withdrawal, proof of receipt, recommendation, acceptance and relieving order as distinct documents. For administrators, the case illustrates why an intervening withdrawal must reach the competent decision-maker before action proceeds on an earlier recommendation.
Current status
The 10 September 2026 judgment finally allowed this writ petition; it was not an interim reinstatement order. No subsequent stay or modification was located in the public sources checked for this article. Actual implementation of the reinstatement direction and any filing not visible in those sources have not been independently verified.
The development was independently reported by LiveLaw and The Indian Express on 14 September. The legal analysis above is based on the judgment, rather than treating the reporting date as the decision date.
Last verified: 15 September 2026, 03:37 PM IST.